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ABSTRACT1 
 
We study the determinants of the (steady-state) POUM effect in a model where the 
individuals evaluate their expected future income using both their current income and 
observable characteristics such as education, race or gender.  
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1. Introduction  
Social mobility has often been invoked to explain the low levels of redistribution in the 
modern democracies: given that today's poor may be the wealthy of tomorrow, the poor may 
not support high levels of redistribution. In other words, social mobility, understood as the 
possibility to make it up (or down) in the income ladder, could affect individual preferences 
for redistributive policies. This effect is denoted as “Prospect Of Upward Mobility” (POUM 
effect). 
The first author to use this argument was Tocqueville (1835), who suggested that the 
difference in attitudes toward redistribution between Europe and the United States could be 
explained by presumed differences in social mobility. An early research that analyzes the 
relation between social mobility and redistribution is Hirschmann and Rothschild (1973). 
They consider that an individual's welfare depends on his present state of contentment as 
well as on his expected future contentment. More recently, Piketty (1995) addresses 
intergenerational mobility to explain heterogeneous preferences toward redistribution.2 
Bénabou and Ok (2001b) (BO hereafter) formalize this idea: agents know the true 
mobility process and maximize the actual value of their expected incomes in future years. 
The main result is that the POUM effect depends on a particular property of the mobility 
process: when expected future income is a strictly concave function of current income, the 
fraction of people with an expected future income below the expected mean income is 
smaller than the fraction of people with current income below the mean income.  
A crucial assumption in BO is that the income mobility process is the same for all 
individuals. To this respect, BO explicitly warn that “it is fairly restrictive, especially in an 
intragenerational context”. As they further clarify, the assumption implies that "one 
abstracts from life-cicle earnings profiles and other lasting heterogeneity such as race, or 
occupation, which would introduce additional state variables into the income dynamics". 
Indeed, recent research supports the idea that preferences toward redistribution depend on 
some individual characteristics (Beckman and Zheng (2007) and Rainer and Siedler (2008)). 
This paper elaborates on this explicit caveat of BO and extends their model to a case 
with two social groups characterized by different income dynamics. We show, for the case 
of a log-linear AR(1) specification of the income mobility processes, that the (steady-state) 
POUM effect depends on the concavity of expected incomes (w.r.t. current incomes) and the 
length of policy horizon. We find that more concave income mobility processes and longer 
policy horizons imply a stronger polarization in the preferences toward redistribution. 
Finally, to support these results, we present a preliminary estimation of the POUM effect 
using Italian data.  
                                                 
2
 Other related papers are those that link social mobility and future income prospects. For example, Dardanoni 
(1993) and Bénabou and Ok (2001a) consider mobility as an equalizer of opportunities and assess mobility 
processes according to the level of inequality in the distribution of expected future incomes. Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) provide empirical evidences on the POUM effect: they show 
that social mobility has a negative effect on the demand for redistribution.  
 
  DEAMS working paper 3/2011 
   
 5 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. In Section 3 the 
main results are analyzed and discussed. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are in the 
Appendix.   
2. The Model 
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals indexed by  ∈ 0,1, 
whose income, y, lies in some interval  ≡ 0, 
,  0 < 
 ≤ ∞ with mean . According to 
some personal characteristics, the population can be divided into two groups, indexed by  ∈ , . By  we denote the number of individuals in group k.  
Individuals have to choose, under majority voting, a redistributive proportional scheme, 
that is defined as a function :  →  that associates to each gross income 
 a level of 
disposable income 
;  :  
(1)    !
;  = 1 − $ 
 + $  ,   $ ∈ 0,1     
In what follows we concentrate on the choice between two different redistributive 
schemes, absence of redistribution, ', and complete redistribution, (.3    
Individuals are characterized by an income mobility process depending on the group to 
which they belong. For group k, the income mobility process is described by a 
function )*|, , that gives the probability that an individual with a current income 
- = , will have at most 
-( = *. We require that the income processes are stationary and 
that they are characterized by a unique invariant income distribution and by expected 
incomes that are increasing and continuous functions of the current income. We denote by .y  the cumulative function of the steady-state income distribution, and we require that it 
is continuous and strictly increasing. We denote by  the mean income in group k and we 
assume 0 > 2. 
To study how the income mobility influences the share of the population favorable to 
redistribution, our benchmark is the case without concerns on income mobility. To eliminate 
the consideration of mobility, in the benchmark we assume that in every period people vote 
for a redistribution policy that takes place in the same period. Then agent i prefers  ( to  ' 
if and only if 
 ≤ . The share of the population that votes for ( is given by: 
(2)     3 = 0.0 + 2.2  0 + 2 ⁄  
Now, we focus on a two-period scenario where voters have to choose at time t the 
redistribution scheme that will be enacted in t+1. Assuming rationality and risk neutrality, 
agent i prefers  ( to  ' if and only if 56
,-(|
,-7 ≤ . Then, for each group k, there 
exists a threshold 
8 such that each individual i (belonging to the group ) prefers ( to ' if 
and only if   
,- ∈ 90, 
8 9.4 The share of the population that votes for ( is given by: 
(3)    3: = 0.0
80 + 2.2
82  0 + 2 ⁄  
                                                 
3
 The analysis can be extended to any possible pair of proportional redistributive schemes. Indeed, an 
individual will prefer the more redistributive scheme if and only if his current income is below the mean. 
4
 It follows from the assumption that 56
,-(|
,-7 is an increasing and continuous function of 
,- 
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The effect of the mobility concerns on the voting decisions is given by the difference 
between the benchmark and the two-period case in the proportion of the population voting 
for (, that is:  
(4)      ; = 3 − 3:. 
Variable P is a measure of the (steady-state) POUM effect and represents the share of 
the population with current income below the mean minus the share of the population with 
expected future income below the mean. The size of the coalition favoring ( is larger with 
mobility concerns than without them if and only if P is negative. Note that even if this 
measure of the (steady-state) POUM effect is related only to the steady-state income 
distribution, it is essential to show that our findings describe not just transitory, short-run 
effects, but stable, permanent ones as well. 
The contribution of each group  ∈ ,  to the (steady-state) POUM effect is given by: 
(5)     ; = =. − .
8 >/0 + 2  
When ; is negative we say that group  is characterized by a Prospect Of Downward 
Mobility (PODM). The measure of the (steady-state) POUM effect, ;, can be rewritten as: 
(6)       ; = ;0 + ;2 
3. Results 
We explore the characteristics of the income mobility processes that affect the (steady-
state) POUM effect. To this aim, in order to have explicit solutions that allows us to study 
how the concavity of the income processes affects the (steady-state) POUM effect, we focus 
on a log-linear AR(1) specification of the income mobility processes. Specifically, the 
individual incomes evolve according to the stochastic process: 
(7)    @ 
,-( = A' + A( @ 
,- + B,,-(    ∈ ,  
where y is the income and ε is an i.i.d individual error term. We assume A( ∈ 90,1 9, and B,,-~D60, EF,G 7 ∀ I. Then, in the invariant income distribution, incomes are log-normally 
distributed, i.e. @ 
,- ~DJ, EG  ∀I where J = A'K + A(K ∙ J and EG = A(G ∙ EG +EFG . Given that 56
,-(|
,-7 = 
,-MNO ∙ P*QRA'K + σT,KG 2⁄  V, parameter A( is a measure of 
concavity as well as of elasticity of expected incomes with respect to current incomes.5 
Moreover, it directly follows that: 
(8)    
8 = 
N
WNO ∙ P*Q X− YA'K + Z[,O\G ] A(K^  _   ∈ , . 
Definition 1. Let `J, EG ≡ `,  ∈ , , be the set of log-linear AR(1) income 
mobility processes with  invariant income distribution given by @ 
 ~DJ, EG .   
                                                 
5
 A widely used measure of concavity for a function a*  is given by − a"* a′* ⁄ , where a larger value 
implies a more concave function. In the log-linear d1  process this measure is given by 1 − A(K 
,-⁄  , then 
the lower A(K  is, the more concave the expected income mobility process is. 
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In order to produce the same invariant income distribution, all income processes in ` 
must satisfy the two following conditions: i) Ae = J1 − A(  and ii) EF,G =EG1 − A(G . Therefore, across the income processes in `, the lower A( is, the 
greater σT,KG  is. In other words, more concave (less elastic) income process will be 
characterized by more skewness in the random shocks. 
Suppose that in both groups steady state income distributions are log-normal with 
parameters J, EG ,  ∈ , . Then, for each group  ∈ , , any of the income 
processes in ` could be possible. Given group sizes 0 and 2, the thresholds  (8) are fully 
determined by the parameters of the income processes that generate the respective income 
distributions. Then, the contribution of each group to the magnitude of the (steady-state) 
POUM effect ( ;0 and  ;2  strictly depends on the specific operating income process (across 
all those in `).   
A concave income transition function is characterized by a threshold 
 >  such that 
the expected income is higher than the current one if and only if the current income is 
below 
. 6 If only one group exists there is a subset of individuals with current incomes 
below (and near)  but the expected ones above.7 With two groups we have that 2 <  <0, then while the rich group threshold 
0 is above  (and therefore there is a subset of 
individuals with income below (and near)  but the expected one above), the poor group 
threshold 
2 could be above or below . In the first case we have some individuals (with 
income below   characterized by a POUM effect in the second case we have some 
individuals (with income above   characterized by a PODM effect. For the poor group the 
level of the concavity, determines the position of 
2 respect to  and, as a consequence, not 
only the magnitude the (steady-state) POUM effect but the direction too.8 The following 
proposition highlights the effects of the concavity. Prior of the statement we define the 
following threshold A̅2 = 0.5E2G@  − @ 2  . 
Proposition 1.  Let be 0 , 2 > 0 and J, EG ,  ∈ ,  such that 0 > 2. For any 
income mobility process in `J, EG ,  ∈ , : 
i ) ;0  is always positive, ;2 is positive if and only if A(2 ≥ A̅2 
ii) ;0  is always decreasing in A(0,  ;2 is decreasing in A(2 if and only if   A(2 ≥  iA̅2 
Given the income distributions DJ, EG ,  ∈ , , the contribution to the (steady-
state) POUM effect of the richer group is always positive and decreasing in A(0,9 while the 
contribution of the poorer group is negative if and only if the income process is sufficiently 
concave (i.e. A(2 ≤ A̅2). Moreover, if ;2 is negative, then it is decreasing in concavity across 
all processes in `2. Otherwise, when ;2 is positive, the effect of the concavity is not 
monotonic (it is decreasing if and only if the concavity of the income mobility process is 
sufficiently high). 
                                                 
6
 The expected income is higher than the current income if and only if 
,-MNO ∙ P*QRA'K + σT,KG 2⁄  V > 
,-. 
Solving for 
,-, we get: 

,- < P*Q j A'K1 − A(K +
σT,KG2 1 − A(K  k = P*Q jJK +
σKG2 1 + A(K  k. 
The right hand side defines 
 that is clearly higher than  = exp J +  σk2 2⁄ ]). 
7
 Note that in this case no one is characterized by a current income above  and an expected income below it. 
8
 I thank an anonymous referee for providing these insightful intuitions. 
9
 i.e. a more concave income mobility process in `0 implies a larger ;0 
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The threshold A̅2 increases in parameter E2G and in the ratio  2⁄ : the poorer group b is 
and/or the more dispersed the incomes are, the smaller the subset of income processes in `2 
generating a positive ;2 is.10 Furthermore, if group b is poor enough and/or incomes are 
sufficiently dispersed, the threshold A̅2 can be larger than 1, so that ;2 is always negative 
and increasing in A(2. Thus, provided 2 is sufficiently small, more concave (less elastic) 
income mobility processes cause stronger polarizations in the preferences toward 
redistribution, i.e. an increase (reduction) in the proportion of individuals in the poorer 
(richer) group preferring redistribution.  Finally, we focus our attention on the proportions of 
the two groups (0, 2 . Given the income distributions, the ratio    2⁄ decreases in the 
relative size of the poorer group (since   decreases). As a consequence, the threshold A̅2 
decreases too. Then, for a given value of  A(2, if the relative size of the poorer group is 
sufficiently high, ;2 is positive. It is due to the fact that  moves (near to 2) below 
threshold 
2, so that some agents with income below  have an expected income above it. 
Summarizing, we see that in group a there is a subset of individuals characterized by a 
POUM effect as well as in group b (when it is sufficiently poor or the income transition 
process is sufficiently concave) there is a subset of individuals characterized by a PODM 
effect. Then, which one of the two effects dominates depends on the parameters, with a 
central role of the concavity of the income processes. As a direct application of Proposition 
1, it is directly verifiable that, when  0 <  2, given the income distributions and any 
generating income process in `0J0, E0G , sufficiently concave income processes in `2J2, E2G  imply that PODM effect of group b dominates the POUM effect of group a. 11 
Now we study how the length of the horizon, over which the redistribution scheme is 
set, affects the (steady-state) POUM effect. We assume that at time t individuals vote for a 
redistributive policy that will be implemented from t+1 until t+T. Then agent i prefers  ( to  ' if and only if ∑ 3q56
,-q|
,-7rqs( ≤ ∑ 3qrqs(  where 0 < 3 ≤ 1 is a discount factor. 
Let ;r, k ∈ a, b, be the contribution to the (steady-state) POUM effect of group k when 
the redistributive policy is implemented for T periods.    
Proposition 2. ;0r is always increasing in v and, if A(2 ≤ A̅2, ;2r  is decreasing in v. 
While the length of the policy horizon increases the contribution to the (steady-state) 
POUM effect of group a, its effect on the contribution of group b depends on the 
parameters. Given the income distribution, if the income process is sufficiently concave, 
then a larger policy horizon implies a smaller ;2r, i.e. a greater PODM effect. In such a 
case, a longer policy horizon causes a stronger polarization in the preferences toward 
redistribution.   
Empirical Evidence 
In this subsection our purpose is not to carry out a large empirical study or a detailed 
calibration, but to show how the results described above are empirically plausible. We 
perform, for the period 1989–2004, a preliminary empirical analysis using the Bank of Italy 
                                                 
10
 Note that the ratio   2⁄  can be written as 0 0 + 2 2 0 + 2  2⁄   that is decreasing in 2 
11
 Given the income distributions, Proposition 1 says that for all the income process in `2J2 , E2G  s.t. A(2 ≤A̅2, ;2  is negative and increasing in A(2 (i.e. decreasing in concavity). Therefore, increasing the concavity of 
the income process, the PODM effect increases monotonically with an upper bound of 2.  
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Survey on Italian Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). This survey collects data every 
two years from a sample of approximately 8000 households for each year.12 Since 1989, part 
of the sample has comprised around 40% of households interviewed in previous surveys 
(panel households). This survey reports information on the household as well as of its 
components.13 In our analysis we use the individual income, reported in euro and deflated at 
2004 values.14 The individual income distribution considered here shows, on average, 62.8% 
of individuals with an income below the average. 
In order to illustrate how heterogeneity in the mobility process affects the measurement 
of the POUM effect, we compare two different measures computed under the following 
assumptions:  
(m1): the mobility process is the same for all the individuals,  
(m2): the mobility processes differ in accordance to the work status of the individuals; 
junior managers, managers and self-employed (group a) are characterized by a different 
mobility process in comparison all others (group b).15 
Under each assumption, to measure the POUM effect, we go through the following 
steps: i) we estimate the log-linear AR(1) process in  (7) with fixed effects;16 ii) we compute 
the expected individual incomes;17 iii) we compute the POUM effect. In Table 1, for each 
assumption we report the estimation results of the income mobility processes, the POUM 
effect ;r , computed for different values of policy horizons T (assuming 3 = 1), and the 
groups’ contributions to the POUM effect ;0r ,  ;2r . Under assumption m1, we find a 
positive and increasing in v POUM effect. Under assumption m2, we find a negative and 
decreasing in v POUM effect: it results from a positive (and increasing in T) contribution of 
group a and a negative (and decreasing in T) contribution of group b.18 
This exercise shows that the introduction of heterogeneity in the mobility process can 
change drastically the magnitude and the sign of the POUM effect. Under m1, the estimated 
value of the income elasticity (A( < 1) implies a concave expected income function and a 
positive POUM effect. Then, our finding of a PODM effect under m2 shows that concavity 
                                                 
12
 There is one gap of 3 years after the 1995’s survey.  
13
 A detailed description of this survey is available on www.bancaditalia.it. 
14
 To deflate the values we use the annual coefficients provided by ISTAT. 
15
 82.3% of individuals belong to group b (Blue-collar workers, office workers, school teachers and not 
employed) and earn, on average, an income of 0.89 times the mean income of the whole population; 17.7% of 
individuals belong to group a and earn, on average, an income of 1.57 times the mean income (averages over 
the years considered in the survey). 
16
 We assume individual effects w. Then, we estimate the process ln 
,-( = A' + A( ln 
,- + w + B,-( by 
GMM (see Arellano and Bond (1991) for details). As a consequence, we only use data from individuals that 
are included in the survey at least three consecutive periods, and we include year dummies. 
17
 56
,-(|
-7 = P*QRA' + A(
,- + EFG 2⁄  V. We compute the expected income for all the individuals sampled 
in the SHIW, including those that are not in the panel. In order to compute the expected future income in year 
x, we set the value for the term P*QA' + EFG 2⁄   such that the average of the expected incomes equals the 
average of income in year x-1. 
18
 Using the log-linear AR(1) specification of the income mobility process, under m1 the POUM effect has an 
upper limit: the threshold 
8 such that an individual prefers ( to ' if her current income 
,- ∈ 90, 
8 9 is 
8 ≥ P*Q  . This explains the evidence that the POUM effect (under m1) remains constant for v = 3,4. 
Finally, ;2r  remains constant for v = 2,3,4 because, for these policy horizons, all individuals in group a prefer 
r0. 
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in the aggregate income transition function is not a sufficient condition for a positive POUM 
effect.   
 
TABLE 1: estimates of A( and POUM effect under assumptions m1 and m2  
( ∗ significant at the 1%) 
POUM effect 
Policy horizon T → 2 4 6 8 
m1 ;r  14.6 15.3 15.4 15.4 
m2 
;r  -5.4 -13.9 -17.6 -18.8 
;0r 6.9 7.1 7.1 7.1 
;2r -12.3 -21.0 -24.7 -25.9 
Estimates of A( 
m1 .211679* (.0171521) 
m2 
group a .1790161* (.0439709) 
group b .2363868* (.0188056) 
4. Conclusion 
There are several directions to extend the results presented in the paper. For instance, 
one is to generalize our model to many groups, and to use more general income dynamics. 
Another possibility is to divide the population in groups not according to exogenous 
characteristics, but to the individual observed behavior using mixture regression models.  
 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
We consider only the income processes in ΩK, in the expression of 
8 we replace Ae = J1 − A(  and σT,KG = σKG1 − A(KG . After some algebra, we get: 
(9)       
8 = 
N
WNO ∙ P*Q − G (MN ZO\6(MNO\7G MNO   = =>
N
WN ∙ P*Q J + ZO\MNOG   
By  (5), ; ≥ 0 if and only if 
8 ≤ . This condition is verified if and only if A(K ≥62 σKG⁄ 7ln  − ln  .  If  =  this inequality is satisfied for all possible values of A( 
(the right hand side is strictly negative). If  =  the right had side is the threshold ρ. This 
proves the first part of the proposition. The derivative in A(K of the RHS of  (9) is:  
  DEAMS working paper 3/2011 
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=>
N
WN ∙ P*Q J + ZO\MNOG   ∙ =ZO
\
G − (MN\ ln =>>. 
It is negative (i.e. 
8 is decreasing (; is increasing) in A() when A(KG ≤ 62 σKG⁄ 7ln  − ln  . If  =  this inequality is never satisfied for all possible 
values of A( (the RHS is strictly negative). If  =  the RHS is the threshold ρ. Then, we can write it  as: 
A(K ≤  GZO\ ln

 = iρ. 
This proves the second part of the proposition. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Agent i prefers  ( to  ' if and only if: 
(10)                                       ∑ 3q56
,-q|
,-7rqs( ≤ ∑ 3qrqs(           where 
(11)  56
,-q|
,-7 = 
,-MNO ∙ P*QRA'K ∑ A(K(s( + σT,KG ∑ A(KG( s( 2⁄  V ∀ ℎ ≥ 1.  
It follows that the LHS of  (10) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of 
,-. Then, 
for each individual i in group k there exists a unique threshold 
8,r such that she prefers ( to ' if and only if 
,- ∈ 90, 
8 9. Let 
,q be such that 56
,-q|
,q7 = , i.e.: 

,qMNO  P*QRA'K ∑ A(K(s( + σT,KG ∑ A(KG( s( 2⁄  V = . 
Solving for 
,q, we get: 

,q = Y]
(
MNO ∙ P*QRJK + σKGA(K 2⁄  V 
Its derivative is: 
(12)   ,q = =>
N
WNO P*Q J + ZO\MNOG   =ZO
\
G − (MNO\ ln =>> A(K ln A(K. 
It is negative (i.e. 
,q is decreasing in ℎ) when  ≥   P*QR−A(GqσKG/2 V. 
Consider agents belonging to group a. By Proposition 1, we know that 
0,( <   and,19 by 
the above result, we have that 
0,q > 
0,q( ∀ℎ ≥ 1. It is directly verifiable that 
0,r <
80,r < 
0,(. Note that, for 
,- = 
80,r, expression  (10) holds with equality. Increasing the 
policy horizon of one period, for agent i with 
,- = 
80,r we have ∑ 3q56
,-q|
,-7r(qs( >∑ 3qr(qs( , because 56
,r(|
80,r7 > . It directly follows by 
0,r( < 
0,r < 
80,r  and 
by the fact that  (11) is strictly increasing. Given that the LHS of  (10) is strictly increasing 
and a continuous function of 
,-, we get 
80,r( < 
80,r and the result follows. Consider 
agents belonging to group b. Note that, when 2 ≤   P*Q−A(2σG/2  , by Proposition 1 
                                                 
19
 For ℎ = 1 expression  0 is equal to  (9).  
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we know that 
2,( ≥  (cf. footnote 18) and, by the above result, we have that 
2,q >
2,q( ∀ℎ ≥ 1. Since the proof for group b is very similar to the case of group a, it is 
omitted. ■ 
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